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1. Introduction
Bankruptcy lings are major corporate restructuring events that are on average associated
with signicantly negative announcement returns. The literature on pre-ling informed trade
has focused on insider trade in the stock market and has produced mixed results. Part of
the reason could be that prior studies have focused on insider trading in the equities market,
whereas recent literature indicates that informed traders, a sub-set of which are insiders,
often trade in the options market (Cao et al., 2005; Chan et al., Forthcoming), and that
\options markets may be relatively more attractive venues for traders acting on `bad' news"
(Easley et al., 1998, p.458). This paper digs deeper into pre-ling informed trade. We
examine whether the existing informed options trading measure, proxied by options trading
volume divided by stock trading volume, can predict bankruptcy announcement returns. We
also study the informativeness of insider trades in the options market.
Prior evidence on pre-bankruptcy informed trading is limited and the results are mixed.
Seyhun and Bradley (1997) examine 525 rms that led for bankruptcy between 1963 and
1992. They nd that corporate insiders (i.e. top executives) sell stock prior to bankruptcy
lings. However, Gosnell et al. (1992) nd that while insider trading does increase over the
ve-months before the bankruptcy ling, pre-ling insider stock-trading over the two year
period prior to the ling is not signicantly dierent from that in an industry-size matched
sample of non-ling rms. Beneish et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2013) suggest that insiders
prefer not to sell stock before negative news, at least partially to reduce the risk of a law suit.
The mixed ndings in relation to pre-bankruptcy insider trading could reect the narrow
focus on a single asset class: equities.
The existing literature suggests that the options market can be a preferred venue for
informed trade. Easley et al. (1998) provide theoretical evidence that informed traders may
choose the options market to capitalize on their private information, beneting from the
higher leverage and liquidity in the options market. Recent empirical studies nd that options
trading contains information on future stock returns (see e.g. Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010;
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Johnson and So, 2012; Pan and Poteshman, 2006; Roll et al., 2010; Xing et al., 2010) and
can be a location of price-discovery (Chakravarty et al., 2004). Other papers show that
options trading contains information on several important upcoming corporate events, such
as takeovers (Augustin et al., 2014; Cao et al., 2005; Chan et al., Forthcoming), earnings
announcements (Jin et al., 2012; Roll et al., 2010), and analyst news (Lin et al., 2013).
In addition, Poteshman (2006) investigates unusual put option buying before the terrorist
attack on September 11, 2001, nding informed trading in the options market for two airline
companies prior to the attack. Therefore, informed traders may trade in the options market
before the extreme corporate event of a bankruptcy ling.
We hypothesize that both insiders and informed traders take advantage of the higher
leverage of the options market to capitalize on their private information prior to bankruptcy
lings. We expect that this will manifest in a relationship between pre-ling options trad-
ing and returns around the bankruptcy ling. However, a rm's nancial distress usually
develops over time, and there might be a signicant leakage of information in the public
space. If the information is leaked and incorporated into the stock market before the ling
date, we would observe no announcement surprise in stock price, and most importantly, we
wound nd no correlation between pre-ling informed option trading and bankruptcy ling
returns. In other words, if we nd no correlation between pre-ling options trading and an-
nouncement returns, it does not mean that there is no informed trading. It could be that all
the information has been fully reected before the events. Indeed, such information leakage
would make it more dicult to nd our hypothesized result. However, if we do nd the
return predictability, there must be some informed trading and the information is not fully
absorbed before the event.1
1While it is possible that a non-trivial amount of pre-ling trade could be due to non-informed traders
\mimicking" informed traders' activities, the presence of such \mimicking" trades actually pre-supposes
the presence of informed trade. Thus, the presence of any \mimicking" trade would leave the qualitative
interpretation of our results intact.
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Empirically, we start by examining the extent to which pre-ling insider trade in the
equity market and the options market can predict bankruptcy returns. We then adopt the
relative trading volume of options to stock ratio (O/S) to proxy for informed options trading
activity (as per Johnson and So, 2012; Roll et al., 2010), where a higher O/S value indicates
higher options trading relative to stock trading and suggests a greater degree of informed
options trading (Roll et al., 2010). Roll et al. (2010) show that informed trade drives the
cross-sectional and time-series characteristics of O/S. Johnson and So (2012) show that
O/S is negatively related to future stock returns. O/S is thus expected to be negatively
correlated with stock returns around bankruptcy ling dates.2 Compared with measures
that are derived purely from options-market trading, O/S has the advantage of allowing us
to examine the location of informed trade.
We construct a sample of bankruptcy-lings and examine the relationship between stock
trading, options trading and ling-returns. The bankruptcy lings are from the UCLA-
LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD), has featured in the prior bankruptcy liter-
ature (e.g. Jiang et al., 2012).3 We consider rms that le for bankruptcy while still listed
(compared with those le for bankruptcy after delisting), and who were listed between 1996
and 2012. We ensure that the results are robust to expanding the sample to examine trading
behavior around delistings where the rm subsequently les for bankruptcy (as opposed to
the situation where the company les for bankruptcy while still listed). We analyze a sam-
2While it is true that some non-informed traders can attempt to \mimic" informed traders, giving rise
to the appearance of informed trade this does not adversely aect our results. First, there is no per se reason
to believe that \mimicking" trades would systematically occur more in options or in stock. \Mimicking"
trades could change the magnitude of the coecient on O/S. If they occur equally, then the denominator
and numerator of O/S increase by the same scalar, so \mimicking" eects have no impact on the relation
between O/S and bankruptcy returns. Second, if they do systematically occur in either the options or stock
market, then it simply multiples O/S by a scalar, and it presupposes the existence of informed trade (to
\mimic"). So, our results are qualitatively unchanged.
3We thank Lynn M. LoPucki at UCLA for sharing this database.
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ple of 131 bankruptcy-events for which we can obtain all relevant rm-level variables and in
which there is some insider trade. We then exclude those rms without options trading in
this period and obtain a sample of 58 unique bankruptcy ling cases.
We start by examining the location of informed insider trade prior to bankruptcy lings.
We analyze the extent to which pre-ling insider trading in the options market and equities
market predicts bankruptcy ling returns. We nd that insider stock trading, over the period
2 days to 252 days before the ling date, is insignicantly related to bankruptcy returns.
However, insider options trading over that period is negatively, and statistically signicantly,
related to bankruptcy returns. A one standard deviation increase in the amount of insider
options trading is associated with a 13.27% reduction in bankruptcy announcement returns.4
This implies that the options market is the preferred location of trade for insiders. However,
it does not per se indicate the preferred location of trade for non-insiders.
We next analyze the location of informed trade prior to bankruptcy lings. Insiders
typically cannot trade their own stock in the few days prior to a bankruptcy ling (as this
would likely violate insider trading laws). However, if information is leaked to outsiders, they
can enjoy a large prot in the options market by virtue of its embedded leverage. We nd
that the O/S measure from Roll et al. (2010), computed over the interval from two days to
four days before the bankruptcy ling, is signicantly and negatively related to bankruptcy-
ling returns. A one standard deviation increase in O/S is associated with a 10.84 percentage
point decrease in bankruptcy announcement returns.5 We nd similar results whether we use
the pre-bankruptcy level of O/S or its change from the pre-bankruptcy benchmark period,
i.e., 200 to 100 days before the bankruptcy ling, suggesting that the results are not merely
an artefact of the sample rms having a generally higher baseline level of options trade than
4We obtain this coecient by multiplying the coecient on insider options trading in Column 4 of Table
5 by the O/S standard deviation from Table 2.
5We obtain this coecient by multiplying the coecient on O/S in Column 4 of Table 5 by the O/S
standard deviation from Table 2.
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other rms.
Other stock-level characteristics can inuence the role of O/S. Illiquidity in the options
market (as proxied by the options bid-ask spread) reduces O/S's return predictability, con-
sistent with Easley et al. (1998). Additionally, negative stock returns prior to bankruptcy
reduce the predictive power of O/S, suggesting that if informed traders have capitalized on
their private information about the bankruptcy by trading in the stock market, then the
predictive power of O/S is lower.
We support these ndings with simulation evidence, which helps to alleviate the concerns
about identication, spurious correlation, and the small sample of bankrupt rms with op-
tions trading. We examine whether the negative predictability of O/S only exists around our
bankruptcy lings, or also exists on other normal days for non-bankruptcy rms. We adopt
three approaches: (1) we analyze the predictive power of O/S for the bankrupt rms in the
non-bankrupt period, (2) we examine the predictive power for O/S for a randomly chosen
non-ling rm on the ling date, (3) we assess the predictive power of O/S for a randomly
chosen non-bankrupt rm on a randomly chosen non-ling date. In each case we run the
simulation 1,000 times (i.e. we run 1,000 regressions, each with 58 observations, in order to
match the sample size used in the baseline regressions). We nd that the predictive power of
O/S is signicantly lower in these simulated pseudo-events, suggesting that informed trade
in the options market signicantly increases prior to bankruptcy events.6
Our paper contributes to the literature by addressing the question whether options trad-
ing prior to bankruptcy ling contains any information on this extreme event. These ndings
help to resolve some of the prior (conicting) evidence on the presence of pre-bankruptcy
informed trade, which tends to nd limited evidence of pre-ling informed stock-trade.
Whereas prior studies have focused on insider (i.e. top executive) trade in the equities mar-
ket, we focus on options trading (not necessarily from corporate insiders). We also examine
6The nding that O/S has negative return predictability for non-bankrupt rms on non-ling dates is
consistent with Johnson and So (2012).
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the factors that can inuence the presence of informed trade in the options market. The
ndings have important policy implications for regulators when monitoring trading activity
around bankruptcy events.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 details the prior literature and presents
the hypotheses. Section 3 details the sample construction. Section 4 presents the regression
results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses
There is limited prior evidence on pre-bankruptcy informed trade, and the results tend to be
mixed. Seyhun and Bradley (1997) nd that insiders engage in signicant sell-os prior to
bankruptcies. Iqbal and Shetty (2002) indicate that insiders sell shares prior to the antici-
pation of bankruptcy by investors. Ma (2001) suggests that insiders reduce equity purchases
prior to Chapter 11 bankruptcies. However, Ma (2001) nds limited evidence that insid-
ers engage in additional sales prior to bankruptcies. Further, Gosnell et al. (1992) suggest
that pre-bankruptcy insider-trades are not signicantly dierent from those of insiders at an
industry-size matched control sample. Nasser and Gup (2008) nd no evidence of insider
trading in the equities market prior to 129 major bankruptcies between 1995 and 2006. Chen
et al. (2013) argue that insiders might actively try to avoid selling in the equities market
around negative news (in their case, \going concern" statements) due to the risk of law
suits. Similarly, Beneish et al. (2012) nd that insiders prefer not to sell stock prior to bad
news (potentially engaging in earnings management to avoid the appearance of doing so).
Overall, the prior literature, which has focused solely on the equities market, shows only
limited evidence on the presence of pre-ling informed trade.
Examining options-based trade could help to provide further insight into the presence
of pre-bankruptcy informed trade and resolve the conicting literature. While the options
market need not always contain additional information that has not already been reected
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in the stock market (Muravyev et al., 2013), prior literature suggests that the options mar-
ket can be a location of informed trade, allowing informed traders to capitalize on their
information while beneting from the higher leverage and higher liquidity in the options
market (see e.g. Beck, 1993; Easley et al., 1998). Subsequently, Truong (2012) argues that
the presence of options trading increases the informativeness of stock prices. Hu (Forthcom-
ing) suggests that options trades and quotes inuence stock prices through the revelation
of information, while Anderson et al. (Forthcoming) argue that the options market con-
tains informed trade, as indicated by the changes in options-characteristics following the
information-related regulations in Reg FD. Further, Anand and Chakravarty (2007) suggest
that there is informed trading in the options market, as evidenced by stealth-trading-like
characteristics of options trades. Meanwhile, there is evidence that stock returns are as-
sociated with options-characteristics, including put-call ratios (Pan and Poteshman, 2006),
deviations from put-call parity (Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010), and implied volatility skew
(Xing et al., 2010). Importantly for this study, Johnson and So (2012) show that stocks
with higher O/S ratios experience lower returns in the next week, suggesting the presence
of informed trade in the options market, as proxied by the O/S ratio.
Prior literature documents the presence of options trading activity around important
corporate events. Cao et al. (2005) show that call option volume imbalance has a positive
relation with target rm announcement returns in takeovers. Chan et al. (Forthcoming) nd
that implied volatility spread and implied volatility skew have signicant predictability on
acquirer announcement returns in mergers and acquisitions. Hao et al. (2013) suggest that
while the put options market often does not dominate the short sale market in general, put
options can contain information around negative earnings announcements. Other studies also
provide evidence on the informational role of options trading around earnings announcements
(Jin et al., 2012; Roll et al., 2010) and analyst-related news (Lin et al., 2013). Poteshman
(2006) suggests that there was abnormal, and informed, options trading in the two airline
companies (AMR, UAL) that were involved in the 11 September 2011 terrorist attacks. This
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would suggest that the options market could be an attractive market for informed trade
prior to bankruptcy lings. The prior literature yields several testable predictions, which we
summarize in the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Pre-bankruptcy insider stock trade predicts the stock return around the an-
nouncement of the bankruptcy ling.
Hypothesis 2. Pre-bankruptcy insider options trade predicts the stock return around the
announcement of the bankruptcy ling.
Hypothesis 3. Pre-bankruptcy relative options trading volume predicts the stock return
around the announcement of the bankruptcy ling.
The predictive power of options trading is likely to increase with the liquidity of the
options market (and decrease with the liquidity of the stock market). Easley et al. (1998)
indicate informed investors may tend to trade in options market when options liquidity is
high. Thus, the options market will become a less attractive venue of informed trade if
they are less liquid. Therefore, we expect that the relationship between options trading and
bankruptcy returns will become weaker as options become less liquid. Conversely, illiquidity
in the stock market would make the options market a more attractive location of informed
trade. We capture these predictions in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. The relationship between bankruptcy returns and pre-bankruptcy options
trade weakens with the illiquidity of the options market, but strengthens with the illiquidity
of the stock market.
The relationship between pre-bankruptcy options trade and bankruptcy announcement
returns will be weaker if the market has already impounded bankruptcy-related informa-
tion. Dawkins and Rose-Green (2003) indicate that there is often information-leakage before
bankruptcy lings. This would manifest in negative pre-ling stock returns. These stock re-
turns would weaken the relationship between options trading and announcement returns (as
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per Roll et al., 2010). For example Roll et al. (2010) nd that the relationship between O/S
and returns around earnings announcements weakens with pre-event stock returns. Thus,
we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. The relationship between pre-ling options trade and returns around the
ling is weakened by pre-ling trade in the stock market.
3. Data
This section introduces the source of the bankruptcy sample and options data, describes the
sample selection procedure and provides summary statistics.
3.1. Bankruptcy Data
We start by obtaining bankruptcy data from UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database.7
During our sample period, there are 689 bankruptcy lings under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. In order to analyze the bankruptcy announcement return, we rst require
the rms to have returns in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from day t 1
to day t, where day t is the ling date of bankruptcy. We also require accounting information
from Compustat. We require the company to be listed at the time of the bankruptcy ling
(i.e. the ling cannot post-date the rm delisting). These requirements restrict the sample
size to 260 rms.
We next supplement this bankruptcy-sample with data on insider trading and pre-ling
options trading. We gather data on insiders' pre-ling stock-trades and options-trades from
7According to Subrahmanyam et al. (Forthcoming), there are several alternative data sources for bankr-
tupcy lings, such as the New Generation Research's \Public and Major Company Database", the Altman-
NYU Salomon Center Bankruptcy List, Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD), and Moody's Annual
Reports on Bankruptcy and Recovery. However, the additional sample mainly consists of private rms or
smaller rms which tend not to have listed options. For our purpose, we decide to use UCLA-LoPucki
Bankruptcy Research Database which covers most bankruptcy lings by large public rms.
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Thomson Reuters insiders' transactions database. We separately analyze the relationship
between bankruptcy-ling returns and insiders' total trade, their buys, sells, and net-sells, in
the equities market. We supplement this stock-data with data on insiders' options trading.
Requiring the company to have insider stock trading data reduces the sample to 131 obser-
vations. Requiring the company to have options data restricts the sample to 58 observations.
We then examine pre-ling options trading in general. We obtain options trading data from
OptionMetrics. Table 1 contains the variable denitions.
Table A.1 lists the rms in our sample that have options data, with their ling dates,
rm names, and primary SIC codes. In general, our sample is neither concentrated in
particular years nor biased to any particular industry. To examine the informational content
of options trading prior to bankruptcy lings, we tautologically restrict our sample to contain
only optioned rms. This does not introduce a sample selection bias; a company can have
informed trade in the options market only if it has options (nonetheless, the optioned rms
have similar rm-level characteristics to the non-optioned rms, as discussed in Section 3.6).
3.2. Insider Trade Data
We gather data on insider trades in the stock market and the options market from the Thom-
son Reuters insider trading database. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), corporate insiders include directors, ocers, and benecial owners of more than 10%
of a company's stock. They are required to le before the end of the second business day
following the transaction date.8
The insider trading Table I contains stock (non-derivative) transactions and holdings
information led on Form 3, 4, and 5. The insider ling Table II contains derivative trans-
actions and holdings information led on Form 3, 4, and 5. Table II includes open market
derivative transactions as well as award, exercise, and expiration of options. The insider
8Before 2002, corporate insiders need to report to the SEC within 10 days after the end of month in
which they make a transaction.
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derivative trading data is available from January 1996, thus we start our sample from 1996.
For stock trading, if the transaction has an Acquisition/Disposition Code of A (D),
we dene it as an insider stock buy (sell) transaction. The net sell is dened as sell volume
subtracted by buy volume. We also calculate the total volume from insider stock transactions.
For each rm, we aggregate the total amount of insider stock buy, sell, and net sell volume,
respectively, over the interval from day t   252 to day t   2, and then scale it by the total
stock trading volume over this period.
For derivatives trading, we only retain transactions on options, which have the security
title of call option (CALL), non-employee director stock option (DIREO), director's stock
options (DIRO), employee stock option (EMPO), incentive stock option (ISO), non-qualied
stock option (NONQ), options (OPTNS), or put option (PUT). We calculate the total volume
in these categories from day t 252 to day t 2 and scale it by the total stock trading volume
over this period, as the measure of insider options trading.
We use 250 days of data in order to capture the possibility that corporate insiders trade
well before the bankruptcy announcement in order to mitigate concerns over violating insider
trading laws. The results (unreported) are robust to using smaller event windows.
3.3. Options Data
We obtain daily options trading data from OptionMetrics. The data starts in 1996. Thus,
the sample period begins in January 1996 and ends in December 2012. To capture informed
options trading before bankruptcy lings, we adopt the O/S measure as in Roll et al. (2010)
and Johnson and So (2012). O/S is dened as the ratio of options trading volume to stock
trading volume. We include all call and put options when calculating trading volume.9
As documented in Roll et al. (2010), O/S is positively correlated with future absolute
stock returns and can predict absolute returns around earnings announcement. Johnson and
9We excluded options with time to expiration of less than 10 days or more than 60 days since they are
relatively illiquid.
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So (2012) nd that O/S can predict future stock returns. They argue that most of the options
trading comes from put options, thus the relationship between O/S and future returns is
negative. In this paper, we also expect to nd a similarly negative relation between O/S and
bankruptcy announcement returns. Because bankruptcy events are signicant negative news
for rms, announcement returns are large and negative on average. Therefore, instead of
using absolute returns, we just use the abnormal returns around ling dates. We conjecture
that informed investors may trade more options prior to bankruptcy lings and O/S ratio
will be negatively related to the announcement returns.
O/S has several advantages in the context of our study. Prior studies have used proxies
such as \implied volatility spread" (Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010), and \implied volatility
(`IV') skew" (Xing et al., 2010), which are derived from various measures of option trading.
Chan et al. (Forthcoming) show that both measures have predictive power in relation to
acquisition returns. However, both measures are based purely on trade in the options market.
By contrast, O/S does provide an unsigned measure of the relative trading activity in the
options market. This has three main advantages for our study. First, O/S enables us to
examine the relative role of the options market compared with the stock market. Second,
O/S enables us to explore whether informed traders prefer to trade in the options market as
compared with the stock market (whereas the IV skew and IV spread measures would not
capture such a shift). Third, both IV skew and IV spread impose further data restrictions
on the sample, which would further reduce the sample size.
3.4. Announcement Returns
We use the compound abnormal return from day t  1 to day t as the announcement return,
where day t is the bankruptcy ling date. One reason to use a two-day return is that a
signicant proportion of rms do not have CRSP returns immediately after the ling. If
we include day t + 1 return, the sample size is further limited to 42 (although the results
are qualitatively similar if we restrict the sample to these 42 observations and examine the
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three-day return). Further, we conjecture that if informed traders hold private information
on the upcoming bankruptcy ling, they should be aware of the ling date and also the
fact that the stock price will drop dramatically immediately after the announcement. They
may not be interested in the return on day t+ 1 since many rms stop trading on that day.
Therefore, the trading activity and the market reaction on or immediately before the ling
date should be most relevant to us.
In calculating the announcement return, we use buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs)
instead of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). This is due to the abnormal market response
around bankruptcy announcements. As mentioned in Seyhun and Bradley (1997), the stock
prices of many bankruptcy rms fall into single digits. A small change in price can lead to a
large uctuation in stock return. Using CAR may lead to unreasonable numbers in returns.
For example, if the price falls from $10 to $5 and then rises to $10, then the cumulative return
will be -50% +100% = +50%. By contrast, the buy and hold return will be 0%. As a result,
we adopt BHAR to better capture the holding period return in all analyses throughout our
paper. The benchmark for calculating abnormal returns is the buy-and-hold return of the
CRSP value-weighted market return for the same period. The results are robust to using
CARs instead of BHARs or to using the CRSP equally weighted index instead of the value
weighted index.
3.5. Other Characteristics
We also obtain data on several rm characteristics. We calculate the pre-month return as the
compound return earned over the month before the ling, i.e., from day t  23 to day t  2.
We follow Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Baker et al. (2009), and calculate size and book-to-
market (B/M) ratio based on data at the most recent scal year end before bankruptcy ling.
Both are in natural logarithm. We calculate the rm-value by multiplying the end-of-year
stock price by the number of shares outstanding. Book equity is stockholders equity (or rst
available of common equity plus preferred stock par value or book assets minus liabilities)
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minus the preferred stock liquidating value (or rst available of redemption value or par
value) plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits if available and minus
post-retirement assets if available. The B/M ratio is then book assets divided by book assets
minus book equity plus market equity.10 The turnover rate is the total stock trading volume
divided by the number of shares outstanding. We use the average turnover for pre-ling
month, i.e., from day t   23 to day t   2. Comparing between Panel A and Panel B of
Table 1, there is little dierence between our sample and general bankruptcy rms in terms
of these rm characteristics.
[Insert Table 1 about Here]
3.6. Summary Statistics
The summary statistics are in Table 2. As summarized in Table 2 Panel A, the mean O/S
ratio is 0.02 and its standard deviation is 0.03 for our sample rms. As shown in Panel
A of Table 2, our optioned sample rms have a mean return of  28% around bankruptcy
announcements. It is lower than that of general bankruptcy rms which have a mean return
of  12% as shown in Panel B. The standard deviation of BHARs in the optioned-sample
is 0.39, which is smaller than that for general bankruptcy rms. The general corporate-
characteristics of the optioned rms are similar to those of the non-optioned rms. Panel A
of Table 2 summarizes the rm characteristics of the sample rms, which are required to have
CRSP, Compustat, and options data. As a comparison, Panel B contains summary statistics
for all bankruptcy rms with CRSP and Compustat data, but not necessarily options trading
data.
[Insert Table 2 about Here]
10Some rms have negative book equity. Therefore, B/M ratio of equity has missing values when we
take logarithm. We thus use B/M ratio of asset and make the variable denition consistent through out the
paper. In later regressions, we also control for B/M ratio of asset, but using B/M ratio of equity does not
alter our nding.
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Before any discussion about informed options trading, we would like to better understand
the pattern of stock returns around bankruptcy announcements. Figure 1 shows the equal-
weighted average daily abnormal return from day t  30 to day t+ 1 (the results are robust
to using a value-weighted average). We use CRSP market value-weighted return as the
benchmark when calculating abnormal returns. Figure 1a is for our sample optioned rms,
and Figure 1b is for all bankruptcy rms without restrictions on options trading. The
daily returns are almost always negative during this period. However, the returns do not
signicantly decrease until one or two days before the ling date. The stock price drops
dramatically on the ling date. It seems that the market does not fully anticipate the
bankruptcy announcement; and thus, the stock return does not reect this information
before the announcement. In this sense, if pre-ling options trading contains information on
bankruptcy returns, it would reect informed trading in options market.
[Insert Figure 1 about Here]
In Figure 2, we plot equally weighted average BHAR for our sample rms and for all
bankruptcy rms from day t   30 to day t + 1 (the results are robust to using a value-
weighted average). On each day, we compound stock returns from day t  30 to that day, as
each rm's buy-and-hold return. We use the compound CRSP market value-weighted return
as the benchmark in calculating BHARs. Consistent with expectations, average BHARs
decrease gradually from 30 days before the ling and drop signicantly on the ling date.
The pattern for our sample is similar to that for the full set of bankruptcy rms (that need
not have options data).
[Insert Figure 2 about Here]
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4. Analysis
4.1. Pre-ling Insider Trade and Bankruptcy Filing Returns
We start by analyzing the relationship between pre-bankruptcy insider trade and bankruptcy-
ling returns. The results are in Table 3. Prior literature presents mixed ndings on the
presence between pre-ling trade in the stock market, typically nding only limited evidence
of pre-ling insider stock-trade. If there is signicant pre-bankruptcy insider-trade, then
it should be signicantly related to the returns earned around the bankruptcy-ling. We
analyze total insider stock-trade, buys, sells, and net sells. We run OLS regressions where
the dependent variable is two-day BHAR earned on the rm's bankruptcy-ling from day t 1
to day t. None of the insider stock-trade variables are signicantly related to bankruptcy-
ling returns. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. This is not surprising given that there
is only weak evidence in the prior literature on the presence of insider stock-trade prior to
bankruptcy ndings.
[Insert Table 3 about Here]
We next examine pre-ling insider options-trade. We do this by running the same regres-
sion specication as in Table 3, but with the addition of the insider options-trade variable.
The results are in Table 4. We nd that pre-ling options trading is signicantly and
negatively related to bankruptcy-ling returns. Pre-ling insider stock-trade remains in-
signicantly related to ling returns. This result tends to suggest that insider options-trade
conveys useful information about the bankruptcy-event, supporting Hypothesis 2. Overall,
when read together with the insider stock-trade results, these ndings indicate that informed
insiders trade in the options market, rather than the stock market, prior to bankruptcy l-
ings.
[Insert Table 4 about Here]
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4.2. O/S and Bankruptcy Filing Returns
This section examines the relationship between O/S and bankruptcy ling returns. Hypoth-
esis 3 argues that informed traders prefer to trade in the options market; and thus, O/S will
be negatively related to bankruptcy ling returns. We test our hypothesis by examining the
relationship between the two-day BHAR from day t 1 to day t and the O/S ratio computed
over the days t   4 to t   2. We control for the amount of insider options trading and for
insider net sells (the results are qualitatively similar if we control for buys, sells, or total
trade).
The results are in Table 5. Models one to four add progressively more control variables.
The coecient on O/S is negative and statistically signicant, ranging from -3.17 to -3.63 at
1% signicance. This result is economically signicant: A one standard deviation increase
in O/S is associated with a 10.84 percentage point reduction in ling returns. These results
suggest that a signicant portion of pre-ling informed trade occurs in the options market
relative to the stock market. The results support the foregoing nding that insiders prefer
to trade in the options market rather than the stock market.
[Insert Table 5 about Here]
4.3. The Role of Options and Stock Liquidity
We next analyze whether the option-market liquidity inuences the predictive power of
informed options trading. We expect that the options market will be less attractive to
informed traders if it is more illiquid. We measure options liquidty by using options bid-ask
spread, which is the average bid-ask spread for all options on the rm's equity from day t 7
to day t 5.11 The interaction term of O/S and options bid-ask spread captures the additional
eect of options liquidity on the predictability of O/S on bankruptcy announcement returns.
11We use lagged bid-ask spread to avoid the overlap with O/S measure since the options trading will be
aected by contemporaneous bid-ask spread.
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Similarly, we also examine stock market illiquidity, as proxied by the bid-ask spread in the
stock market.
We present the regression results in Table 6, where the dependent variable is the two-
day BHAR from t   1 to t. As shown in the model with all controls, Model 4, O/S still
has a signicant and negative relation with bankruptcy announcement returns. Moreover,
the coecient on the interaction of O/S with the options bid-ask spread is positive and
statistically signicant. It indicates that when the rm has a higher options bid-ask spread,
i.e., has lower options liquidity, O/S will have a weaker relationship with bankruptcy ling
returns. The interaction of O/S with the stock bid-ask spread is negative but statistically
insignicant, suggesting that stock-market liquidity (i.e. the ease of trading in the stock
market) only weakly reduces informed traders' preferences for trading in the options market.
[Insert Table 6 about Here]
4.4. The Impact of Pre-bankruptcy Returns
This section examines how pre-ling stock returns inuence the relationship between O/S
and returns around the bankruptcy-ling. Dawkins and Rose-Green (2003) suggests that
there is often information leakage prior to bankruptcies, which can lead to equity-trading
and reduce the scope for informed traders to prot in the options market. Thus, Roll et al.
(2010) suggests that O/S's predictive power decreases with the presence of pre-event trade
around earnings announcements. To capture the eect of pre-announcement return, we
compute the rm's buy-and-hold return from day t   7 to day t   5. We then interact this
\prior return" variable with O/S and with the insider options-trade variable.
Table 7 shows the cross-sectional regression results that examine the impact of pre-
bankruptcy stock returns. There are several key ndings. First, ling returns are still
signicantly and negatively related to O/S and insider options trading. Second, The interac-
tion terms are signicant and negative. This means that if the pre-ling stock return is more
negative, O/S (or insider options trading) will be less negatively related to ling returns.
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Overall, the results suggest that if information is already impounded into the stock-price,
then options trade will be less informative.
[Insert Table 7 about Here]
4.5. Additional Robustness Checks
We undertake several additional robustness tests, including pseudo-event simulations, in
order to mitigate additional econometric concerns.
4.5.a. Simulations on Pseudo-bankruptcy Events
The foregoing results suggest that insider options trading and O/S can predict returns around
bankruptcy lings. We argue that this is because informed traders trade in the options
market around bankruptcy lings. However, an alternative explanation could be that these
companies ordinarily feature more informed trade in the options market; and thus, the
negative O/S-return relationship is not special for bankruptcies. To exclude this possibility,
and to address identication concerns, we conduct simulations around pseudo-bankruptcy
events. These simulations are of the nature of placebo tests (see e.g. Erel et al., Forthcoming),
where we examine the predictive ability of O/S (and insider options trading) on non-ling
days and/or for non-ling rms.
We use three dierent methods in selecting pseudo-bankruptcy events. In method 1, for
each of our sample rms, we randomly select a non-ling date as the pseudo-ling date, from
all days with options data for that rm. In method 2, on each bankruptcy ling date in
our sample, we randomly choose a non-ling rm as the pseudo-bankruptcy rm on that
day. In method 3, we randomly select a non-ling rm on a non-ling date as the pseudo-
event, from the pool of all rms with options data. After that, we calculate the two-day
(t   1; t) BHAR as the return around pseudo-bankruptcy events. We then replicate the
models that analyze insider options trading and O/S (i.e. Table 4 Column 4 and Table 5
Column 4, respectively). For insider options trading, we regress the BHAR on the insider
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options trading from day t   252 to day t   2 and relevant controls. Similarly, for O/S, we
regress the BHAR on the three day O/S from day t   4 to day t   2 and the controls in
Table 5 Column 4. For each method, we then run 1,000 regressions of 58 observations (i.e.
the same number of observations as in baseline regressions). We then calculate the average
coecient and t-statistic for the O/S coecient.
This simulation approach has some advantages over alternative approaches. We take this
simulation approach as opposed to simply looking at the O/S (or insider options trading)
for the whole market because we want to maintain a similar sample size in each regression
in order to ensure the results are comparable to the foregoing baseline results. Further, we
select random non-bankrupt rms in method 2 and method 3, rather than industry (etc)
matched rms in order to avoid the risk of cross-sectional contamination from the bankrupt
rm onto directly related rms.
Table 8 summarizes the simulation results. Panel A presents simulation evidence in re-
lation to insider options trading (i.e. simulations related to Table 4 Column 4), and Panel
B presents results for the O/S coecient (i.e. simulations related to Table 5 Column 4).
As a comparison, we also list the relevant Insider Options Trading and O/S coecients in
our baseline regression in the column of \original" in each panel. The correlation between
announcement returns and both insider options trading and O/S is stronger for the actual
bankruptcy-ling events than in pseudo-events. For example, using method 3, O/S has an
average coecient of -0.01 (t-statistic = -2.52), which is smaller than original coecient
of -3.17 in Table 5. Thus, although O/S still has negative and signicant predictability
on pseudo-announcement returns, the magnitude is small. For these simulations, we also
calculate the fraction of trials in which the O/S coecient, or the insider options trading co-
ecient, is greater-in-absolute-magnitude than that in our original regression. Importantly,
for all simulations, we nd that no trial has a larger coecient than our original regression.
The simulation analysis conrms that our results are consistent with previous studies that
O/S has some predictability on future returns. However, more importantly, this relationship
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is signicantly stronger around actual bankruptcy ling dates.
[Insert Table 8 about Here]
4.5.b. Change in O/S and O/S Timing
The foregoing models examine the relationship between the level of O/S and ling-returns.
To ensure that the results are not merely an artefact of the sample-companies having a high-
level of O/S we also examine changes in O/S from a pre-ling benchmark period. Following
Johnson and So (2012), we use the O/S from day t  200 to t  100 as the benchmark, and
calculate change in O/S as the dierence between O/S from t 4 to t 2 and the benchmark
O/S. That is, O/S = O/S(t   4; t   2) { O/S(t   200; t   100). The results are in Model
1 of Table 9. The main nding is that O/S is negatively related to ling-returns (at 10%
signicance). The results suggest that an increase in O/S has a signicant and negative
association with bankruptcy announcement returns.
In Model 2 of Table 9, We further examine the relationship between ling-returns and
O/S on day t  2 (where we compute returns from day t  1 to day t). We expect, and nd,
that the coecient on O/S(t 2) is signicantly and negatively related to ling-returns. The
coecient is similar in magnitude to the coecients on O/S(t 4; t 2) reported in Table 5.
4.5.c. BHAR-denition
We ensure that the results are robust to using dierent BHAR windows. The baseline results
(i.e. Table 5) examine the two-day BHAR from day t  1 to day t. Many of the rms delist
after day t. Nonetheless, Models 3 and 4 of Table 9 examine BHARs over the windows
(t   1; t + 1) and (t; t + 1), respectively. Model 5 of Table 9 examines the abnormal return
on day t.
The nding is that the relationship between O/S and all BHAR denitions is similar in
both magnitude and statistical signicance to those in the main models (Table 5). Indeed,
the coecient on O/S in all of Models 3-5 of Table 9 is larger in magnitude than is the
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coecient on O/S in the main models in Table 5. These results suggest that the results are
robust to BHAR window.
4.5.d. Short Interest
We check that the results are robust to controlling for short interest and/or to restricting
the sample to contain only companies that have short interest. One possibility is that
informed traders could also trade in the equity market by shorting the company's stocks
(see e.g. Boehmer et al., 2010, 2008, 2013; Boehmer and Wu, 2013; Diether et al., 2009;
Hao et al., 2013). For example, Blau and Tew (2014) argue that short sales increase prior
to securities class actions, which would have similarly negative implications to bankruptcy
announcements. This would lessen the role of the (put) options market as a venue for
informed trade. Further, for companies that lack short interest, the options market would
the the most plausible venue for informed trade. Additionally, the presence of a short-sale
market can contribute to the liquidity of the options market, as put-option-writers can use
short sales to hedge their risk and the absence of a short-sale market can drive more informed
trade to the put-option-market, thereby increasing option bid-ask spreads (see e.g. Battalio
and Schultz, 2011; Grundy et al., 2012). Subsequently, we also ensure that the results are
robust to restricting the sample to comprise rms that have short interest and to controlling
for that short interest.
The results are in Model 6 of Table 9. The main nding are that O/S is still negatively
related to the returns earned around the bankruptcy ling. Further, short interest is sig-
nicantly negatively related to ling-returns, consistent with the idea that informed traders
will short the company's stock prior to the bankruptcy ling. These results are consistent
with the nding in Hao et al. (2013) that while short sales often contain more information
than put-trades, the put options market has more information around negative earnings
announcements (i.e. around negative events).
[Insert Table 9 about Here]
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4.5.e. Other Sources of \Bankrupt" Firms
This study uses a sample of companies that le for bankruptcy while listed. An alternative
is to examine companies who delist for bankruptcy-related reasons. Our original sample has
the advantage of avoiding the possibility that pre-delisting short-selling actually contributes
to the delisting by reducing the stock price and causing it to breach minimum price rules.
We identify these delistings as ones that are recorded with delisting codes 400-499 and 573 in
CRSP. This provides a sample of 52 delisting observations (where the rms have the requisite
options data). We examine the return earned over day t   1 to day t around the delisting.
We produce three sets of results in Table 10. Columns 1 and 2 examine the set of 52
delisting events from CRSP. The dependent variable is the two-day BHAR from day t   1
to day t. Columns 3 and 4 take the original set of 58 companies that le for bankruptcy.
CRSP reports that an additional 21 companies delist for liquidation/bankruptcy reasons.
We combine these 21 observations with the original 58 observations. For the original 58
observations, we use the same data as in the baseline regressions. For the additional 21
observations, we gather return and O/S data from around the delisting. In this sample, each
company can only account for one observation. The third set of results is in Columns 5 and
6. Here, we combine the original 58 observations (where we gather data from around the
ling) with the additional 52 delistings (where we gather data from around the delisting).
In this sample, a company can appear in two observations.
The results, in Table 10, are consistent with the previously reported results. O/S is
negatively and signicantly related to returns around the delisting (in Columns 1 and 2).
This result continues to hold in Columns 3 and 4, and in Columns 5 and 6, where we combine
the original bankruptcy-ling sample with the delisting sample. The coecients in all models
are of a similar magnitude to those in the baseline models. This suggests that options trading
has predictive power around bankruptcy-related delistings in addition to bankruptcy lings.
[Insert Table 10 about Here]
24
4.5.f. Other Robustness Tests
The results are robust to variable denition issues (these results are untabulated for brevity).
The results hold if we use CARs instead of BHARs to compute the bankruptcy ling returns.
The reported results are based on BHARs that use a value-weighted market index. The
results are robust to using an equally-weighted market index.
The results are robust to time eects and industry eects. The sample contains 58
bankruptcy ling observations that are evenly dispersed across time and industry. This
makes it dicult to control for year and industry xed eects without both signicantly
reducing the degrees of freedom and creating collinearity between the rm-level variables
and the xed eects. Nonetheless, the results are robust to excluding bankruptcies that
occur during the nancial crisis years (2008, 2009). The results are also robust to using the
full sample and including a dummy for whether the bankruptcy ling occurs during 2008
or 2009. Excluding such bankruptcies reduces the sample size by 12 observations. The
results are also qualitatively similar if we include SIC one digit industry dummies. This is
unsurprising given that the sample is relatively evenly dispersed across time. The evidence
from the simulation tests also helps to mitigate concerns about time eects; specically,
as indicated above, O/S has much lower predictive power on the ling dates for the set
of simulation-selected non-ling rms, suggesting that the predictive ability of O/S is not
merely a time-eect.
5. Conclusion
The prior literature on pre-bankruptcy informed-trade has focused on insider (i.e. top exec-
utive) trading in the equities and has tended to show limited evidence of pre-ling insider
stock-trade. While there is some evidence that insiders trade equity prior to bankruptcy
lings (Seyhun and Bradley, 1997), other evidence suggests that pre-bankruptcy insider
trading is not signicantly dierent from insider trading at industry-size matched control
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rms (Gosnell et al., 1992). One reason for the lack of evidence on pre-ling insider (or
informed) trade could be the focus on the equities market as opposed to the options market.
We contribute to the literature by examining the presence of pre-bankruptcy insider-
trade and informed-trade in the options market. Prior studies suggest that informed traders
sometimes trade in the options market prior to the announcement of corporate events, such
as takeovers (Cao et al., 2005; Chan et al., Forthcoming). Subsequently, we analyze the
presence of insider trade prior to bankruptcy lings. We also use a similar framework to
that in Roll et al. (2010) and Johnson and So (2012) to examine the role of pre-bankruptcy
informed trade in the options market. We test the relationship between the pre-ling ratio
of options trade to stock trade (O/S) and returns around the announcement of the ling.
We start by analyzing pre-ling insider stock trading and options trading. In our sample,
pre-ling insider stock trading is not signicantly related to bankruptcy ling returns. By
contrast, pre-ling insider options trading is signicantly negatively related to ling returns.
This suggests that informed insiders tend to trade in the options market rather than the
stock market.
We then explore the presence of pre-ling informed trade (as opposed to insider trade).
We nd a negative relationship between ling announcement returns and both the level of
O/S and the change in O/S from a pre-bankruptcy \benchmark" period. We support these
results with simulations using pseudo-bankruptcy events, in which we examine the predictive
ability of O/S for (1) the set of bankruptcy-rms in a non-bankruptcy period, (2) a set of
non-bankruptcy rms on the bankruptcy ling dates, and (3) a set of non-bankruptcy rms
on non-ling days. We nd that while O/S still predicts stock returns in these simulation
results; however, the predictive ability is signicantly lower than it is for the bankruptcy
sample. This is consistent with the idea that informed traders often trade in the options
market and options trade can predict stock returns in general (Johnson and So, 2012; Roll
et al., 2010), but this informed trade increases prior to bankruptcy announcements. We also
nd that informed trade in the options market decreases with the options market's illiquidity
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and with the amount of information that is already impounded into stock prices.
The results contribute to the literature in several ways. Examining insider trade and
informed trade in the options market helps to reconcile the mixed evidence (in the equities
market) on the presence of pre-ling insider trade. We highlight that there is indeed pre-
ling insider and informed trade, but that it concentrates in the options market rather than
the stock market. We also contribute to the literature on the location of informed trade by
highlighting that the options market is one location of informed trade prior to a signicant
corporate event. The results have regulatory-implications for the analysis of trading activity
prior to bankruptcy events.
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Tables
Table 1: Variable Denitions
Variable Denition
BHAR(t   1; t+ 2) The buy and hold abnormal return over the interval from
day t   1 to day t + 2. The abnormal return on a given
day is the return earned on the stock less the return earned
on the CRSP value-weighted index. In the main reported
results we use the window from day t   1 to day t.
O/S Dened as in Roll et al. (2010): This is the total options
trading volume divided by the total stock trading volume
over the days t   4 to t   2, where day t is the day of the
bankruptcy ling.
 O/S The change in O/S from a pre-event period to the pre-ling
period. Specically O/S = O/S(t   4; t   2) { O/S(t  
200; t   100), where O/S(1; 2) is the total options trading
scaled by the total stock trading between day 1 and day 2.
Insider options trading The total insider options trading from the Thomson Reuters
insider trading database scaled by the total amount of stock
trading. This is computed from day t   252 to t   2.
Insider stock total The total insider stock trading from the Thomson Reuters
insider trading database scaled by the total amount of stock
trading. This is computed from day t   252 to t   2.
Insider stock buy The total insider stock-buys from the Thomson Reuters in-
sider trading database scaled by the total amount of stock
trading. This is computed from day t   252 to t   2.
Insider stock sell The total insider stock-se;;s from the Thomson Reuters in-
sider trading database scaled by the total amount of stock
trading. This is computed from day t   252 to t   2.
Insider stock net sell The total insider net sells from the Thomson Reuters in-
sider trading database scaled by the total amount of stock
trading. This is computed from day t   252 to t   2.
Pre-month return The buy and hold return from day t 23 to day t 2 where
day t is the day of the bankruptcy ling.
Size The natural log of the year-end stock price
(CRSP/Compustat: prcc f) multipled by the shares
outstanding (Compustat: csho).
B/M The natural log of the rm's book-to-market. The book-
to-market is the rm's total assets (Compustat: at) scaled
by its market value of assets. The market value of assets is
the rm's book assets less its book equity (Compustat: ceq)
plus its market capitalization.
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Turnover The average total stock trading volume divided by the num-
ber of shares outstanding for day t 23 through to day t 2.
The data is from CRSP.
Prior return The compounded return from day t  7 to day t  5, where
day t is the day of the bankruptcy ling. The data is from
CRSP.
Options bid-ask spread The average bid-ask spread for all options on the rm's eq-
uity from day t   7 to day t   5.
Stock bid-ask spread The average bid-ask spread on the rm's stock from day
t   7 to day t   5.
Short interest The short interest from Compustat from the month prior to
the bankruptcy ling.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Bankruptcy Firms
This table summarizes the characteristics of rms which led for bankruptcy from 1996 to 2012.
Panel A shows our nal sample where we require the rms to have returns on day t   1 to day t
in CRSP, accounting information from Compustat, and options trading data from OptionMetrics
before bankruptcy lings. Panel B shows all bankruptcy rms with CRSP and Compustat data,
but not necessarily options trading. Table 1 contains the variable denitions.
No. Obs Mean Std Q1 Median Q3
Panel A: Sample with options data
BHAR 58 -0.2754 0.3934 -0.6506 -0.2287 -0.0542
Pre-month return 58 -0.3477 0.6215 -0.6800 -0.3897 -0.1862
Size 58 5.7353 1.8207 4.4853 5.5338 6.8215
B/M 58 -0.0730 0.2732 -0.1342 -0.0375 0.0562
Turnover 58 0.0487 0.0398 0.0158 0.0335 0.0695
O/S 58 0.0194 0.0342 0.0000 0.0008 0.0226
Insider options trading 58 0.0033 0.0068 0.0000 0.0008 0.0025
Insider stock total 58 0.0075 0.0171 0.0004 0.0009 0.0044
Insider stock buy 58 0.0055 0.0152 0.0002 0.0005 0.0017
Insider stock sell 58 0.0021 0.0054 0.0000 0.0001 0.0011
Insider stock net sell 58 -0.0034 0.0152 -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0001
Panel B: All bankruptcy rms with CRSP and Compustat Data
BHAR 241 -0.1194 0.7554 -0.3778 -0.1075 -0.0031
Pre-month return 252 -0.3085 0.4784 -0.6522 -0.3680 -0.1187
Size 168 4.5792 1.7010 3.5426 4.4283 5.4853
B/M 166 -0.0094 0.2323 -0.0918 -0.0088 0.0902
Turnover 252 0.0272 0.0359 0.0055 0.0147 0.0316
Insider options trading 260 0.0081 0.0266 0.0000 0.0003 0.0045
Insider stock total 260 0.0858 0.9828 0.0001 0.0020 0.0146
Insider stock buy 260 0.0402 0.4908 0.0000 0.0007 0.0054
Insider stock sell 260 0.0456 0.4942 0.0000 0.0001 0.0033
Insider stock net sell 260 0.0054 0.0664 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0003
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Table 3: Pre-bankruptcy Insider Stock Trading and Bankruptcy Returns
This table presents the cross-sectional regression results of bankruptcy announcement returns on
pre-ling insider stock trading and other control variables. The dependent variable is the two-day
(t  1; t) buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) where day t is the bankruptcy ling date, and we
use the compounded CRSP value-weighted market return as the benchmark. Table 1 contains the
variable denitions. Parentheses contain t-statistics. The t-statistics are computed using White
(1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, and ***, **, and * indicate signicance at 1%,
5%, and 10% level respectively.
Model 1 2 3 4
Insider stock total 0.01
(1.17)
Insider stock buy 0.01
(1.42)
Insider stock sell 0.01
(0.91)
Insider stock net sell -0.16
(-0.64)
Pre-month return -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
(-1.22) (-1.23) (-1.22) (-1.22)
Size 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.62)
B/M 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
(1.36) (1.36) (1.36) (1.34)
Turnover -3.42* -3.42* -3.43* -3.46*
(-1.95) (-1.95) (-1.95) (-1.98)
Intercept -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22
(-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.23)
N 131 131 131 131
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
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Table 4: Pre-bankruptcy Insider Options Trading and Bankruptcy Returns
This table presents the cross-sectional regression results of bankruptcy announcement returns
on pre-ling insider options trading, and other control variables. The dependent variable is
the two-day (t   1; t) buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) where day t is the bankruptcy
ling date, and we use the compounded CRSP value-weighted market return as the benchmark.
Table 1 contains the variable denitions. Parentheses contain t-statistics. The t-statistics are
computed using White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, and ***, **, and *
indicate signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Insider options trading -19.08*** -18.96*** -18.81*** -18.99*** -18.67***
(-3.13) (-3.04) (-3.00) (-3.09) (-2.98)
Insider stock total 0.73
(0.38)
Insider stock buy 1.40
(0.71)
Insider stock sell -3.60
(-0.60)
Insider stock net sell -1.94
(-1.05)
Pre-month return -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** -0.19** -0.19**
(-2.51) (-2.46) (-2.53) (-2.39) (-2.58)
Size -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(-1.10) (-1.12) (-1.16) (-1.12) (-1.21)
B/M 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.18)
Turnover -2.22* -2.15 -2.06 -2.17* -1.97
(-1.84) (-1.65) (-1.57) (-1.81) (-1.52)
Intercept 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
(0.35) (0.33) (0.33) (0.38) (0.34)
N 58 58 58 58 58
R-squared 0.191 0.192 0.194 0.194 0.196
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Table 5: O/S and Bankruptcy Filing Returns
This table presents the cross-sectional regression results of bankruptcy announcement returns on
pre-ling options to stock trading volume ratio (O/S) and other control variables. The dependent
variable is the two-day (t   1; t) buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) where day t is the
bankruptcy ling date. Table 1 contains the variable denitions. Parentheses contain t-statistics.
The t-statistics are computed using White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, and
***, **, and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Model 1 2 3 4
O/S -3.63*** -3.88*** -3.49*** -3.17**
(-3.05) (-3.13) (-3.01) (-2.50)
Insider options trading -16.04*** -16.57*** -17.37*** -19.54***
(-3.13) (-3.35) (-3.10) (-3.34)
Insider stock net sell -1.84 -2.44 -2.55 -1.56
(-0.97) (-1.26) (-1.37) (-0.80)
Pre-month return -0.14** -0.17*** -0.17**
(-2.23) (-2.68) (-2.51)
Size -0.02 -0.01
(-0.57) (-0.29)
B/M 0.14 0.16
(0.55) (0.66)
Turnover -1.50
(-1.13)
Intercept -0.16** -0.20*** -0.09 -0.07
(-2.24) (-3.31) (-0.43) (-0.33)
N 58 58 58 58
Adj. R-square 0.1089 0.1454 0.1385 0.1390
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Table 6: The Role of Options Liquidity
This table shows the cross-sectional regression results of bankruptcy announcement return on
O/S and its interaction with pre-ling options stock bid-ask spread. The dependent variable
is the two-day (t   1; t) buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) where day t is the bankruptcy
ling date, and we use the compounded CRSP value-weighted market return as the benchmark.
Table 1 contains the variable denitions. Parentheses contain t-statistics. The t-statistics are
computed using White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, and ***, **, and *
indicate signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Model 1 2 3 4
O/S -9.57*** -9.72** -8.08** -8.09*
(-2.89) (-2.40) (-2.02) (-1.75)
Insider options trading -14.73*** -16.18*** -12.71** -13.77**
(-2.69) (-2.73) (-2.64) (-2.55)
Insider stock net sell -1.55 -1.70 -2.45 -2.39
(-0.77) (-0.85) (-1.17) (-1.10)
O/S*Options bid-ask spread 8.87** 8.85* 8.72** 8.50*
(2.08) (1.81) (2.12) (1.74)
Options bid-ask spread -0.16 -0.31 -0.15 -0.34
(-0.85) (-1.46) (-0.77) (-1.59)
O/S*Stock bid-ask spread -5.78 -6.07
(-0.39) (-0.44)
Stock bid-ask spread 0.66 0.68
(1.46) (1.38)
Pre-month return -0.19*** -0.13**
(-2.77) (-2.39)
Size -0.02 -0.03
(-0.48) (-0.59)
B/M 0.17 0.26
(0.67) (1.14)
Turnover -1.01 -0.98
(-0.69) (-0.69)
Intercept -0.01 0.25 -0.17 0.18
(-0.05) (0.68) (-0.81) (0.47)
N 58 58 58 58
R-square 0.190 0.280 0.270 0.350
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Table 7: The Impact of Pre-bankruptcy Return
This table shows the cross-sectional regression results of bankruptcy announcement returns on
O/S and its interaction with pre-ling returns. The dependent variable is the two-day (t   1; t)
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) where day t is the bankruptcy ling date, and we use the
compounded CRSP value-weighted market return as the benchmark. Table 1 contains the variable
denitions. Parentheses contain t-statistics. The t-statistics are computed using White (1980)
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, and ***, **, and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Model 1 2 3
O/S -4.37*** -4.32***
(-3.55) (-3.44)
O/S*Prior return -9.01** -9.03**
(-2.51) (-2.40)
Insider options trading -23.52*** -24.39*** -23.91***
(-3.99) (-4.42) (-4.26)
Insider options trading*Prior return -37.49* -36.25** -36.06*
(-1.76) (-2.01) (-1.99)
Insider stock net sell -2.52
(-1.20)
Prior return -0.08 0.03 0.00
(-0.50) (0.15) (0.02)
Pre-month return -0.16** -0.12** -0.13**
(-2.60) (-2.15) (-2.24)
Size -0.04 0.01 0.00
(-1.15) (0.21) (0.05)
B/M 0.07 0.24 0.22
(0.30) (1.00) (0.92)
Turnover -2.33* -2.19* -1.90
(-1.83) (-1.72) (-1.47)
Intercept 0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(0.46) (-0.48) (-0.47)
N 58 58 58
R-squared 0.2169 0.3150 0.3229
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Table 8: Simulations on Pseudo-bankruptcy Filings
This table shows the simulation regression results on pseudo-bankruptcy lings. We use three
methods in selecting the pseudo-events. Using method 1, for each bankruptcy rm, we randomly
choose a non-ling date as the pseudo-ling date, from all days with options trading data for
that rm. Using method 2, on each bankruptcy ling date in our sample, we randomly select a
non-bankruptcy rm as the pseudo-rm. Using method 3, we randomly select a non-bankruptcy
rm on a non-ling date as the pseudo-event from the pool of all rms with options trading
data. After that, we calculate buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) from day t   1 to t
as the pseudo-announcement return. For Panel A, we regress the BHAR on insider options
trading, controlling for insider stock net sells, pre-month return, size, B/M, and turnover. For
Panel B, we regress the BHAR on O/S computed from day t   4 to t   3, controlling for the
factors used in Panel A. Variable denitions are in Table 1. For each regression, we run above
process is repeated for 1,000 times. We then calculate the average coecient and its t-statistics
(in parenthesis). We also calculate the fraction of simulation coecients that are higher than
the simulation coecient in the original \baseline" OLS regression (reported in brackets). In
each case, we also report the original coecient from the baseline regression. For the models in
Panel A, the \original" coecient is in Table 4 Column 4 and for Panel B it is in Table 5 Column 4.
Panel A: Insider Options Trading
Original
(Table 4,
Column 4)
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
Insider Options Trading Coecient -18.67 0.03 -0.01 -0.00
t-stat (-2.98) (1.07) (-0.36) (-0.11)
Proportion higher than original [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Panel B: O/S
Original
(Table 5,
Column 4)
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
O/S Coecient -3.17 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
t-stat (-2.40) (-2.93) (-2.52) (-2.52)
Proportion higher than original [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Table 9: Robustness Tests
This table contains OLS regression models that reect various robustness tests. Model 1 focuses
on the change in O/S from a pre-event benchmark period to the pre-ling period. Specically,
O/S = O/S(t   4; t   2) { O/S(t   200; t   100), where O/S(1; 2) is the total options trading
scaled by the total stock trading between day 1 and day 2. Model 2 uses the O/S on day t   2.
Models 3-4 use the same O/S measure as in the main results (i.e. Table 5), but focus on dierent
event-windows. Model 3 examines BHARs from day t   1 to day t + 1, Model 4 from day t to
day t + 1, Model 5 examines the abnormal return on day t. Model 6 contains a regression that
controls from short interest, obtained from the Compustat short interest data. Table 1 contains
the variable denitions. Parentheses contain White (1980) t-statistics and superscripts ***, **,
and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR AR BHAR
(-1,0) (-1,0) (-1,1) (0,1) (0) (-1,0)
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
O/S (t  2) -3.13***
(-3.19)
O/S (t  4; t  2) -4.33** -6.45* -4.39** -3.93***
(-2.47) (-1.94) (-2.50) (-2.86)
 O/S -1.58*
(-1.82)
Insider options trading -17.27*** -19.07*** -13.71** -12.15** -19.93*** -18.64***
(-2.84) (-3.18) (-2.25) (-2.13) (-3.82) (-2.90)
Insider stock net sell -2.20 -1.58 -1.07 -0.65 -0.66 -3.54
(-1.15) (-0.82) (-0.36) (-0.18) (-0.35) (-1.61)
Pre-month return -0.18*** -0.17** -0.16** -0.12 -0.13** -0.13**
(-2.77) (-2.47) (-2.02) (-1.41) (-2.15) (-2.23)
Size -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.03
(-1.25) (-0.49) (0.85) (1.29) (0.56) (0.85)
B/M 0.04 0.13 0.20 -0.14 -0.06 0.20
(0.16) (0.52) (0.71) (-0.28) (-0.13) (0.65)
Turnover -2.15 -1.64 -0.88 -0.85 -2.11 -0.05
(-1.67) (-1.27) (-0.57) (-0.33) (-1.08) (-0.04)
Short Interest -1.99***
(-4.76)
Intercept 0.05 -0.03 -0.47 -0.84 -0.24 -0.31
(0.22) (-0.16) (-1.38) (-1.67) (-0.89) (-1.68)
N 58 58 42 42 42 49
R-squared 0.229 0.242 0.157 0.240 0.280 0.346
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Table 10: Delistings and Filings
This table contains models that examine the relationship between O/S and returns around
delistings and/or lings. Columns 1 and 2 analyze the O/S-return relationship for a sample of
companies that CRSP records as delisting due to bankruptcy or liquidation (i.e. delisting codes
400-499 or 573). Here, the dependent variable is the BHAR from day t   1 to day t, where day
t is the day of delisting. Columns 3 and 4 combine this sample with the original bankruptcy
ling sample. Here, if the company les for bankruptcy in the original sample, then we use the
observations from the original sample. However, if the company is not in the original sample, and
is recorded in CRSP as delisting due to liquidition or bankruptcy, then we include the O/S and
return data from around that delisting. This increases the sample by 21 observations. In Columns
5 and 6 we combine both the delisting and the bankruptcy-ling sample. Here, we include the O/S
and return data around both the ling and the delisting. Table 1 contains the variable denitions.
Parentheses contain White (1980) t-statistics and superscripts ***, **, and * denote signicance
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Sample CRSP delisting sample Filing or delisting Filing and delisting
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
O/S -4.31*** -4.91*** -4.20*** -4.01*** -3.81*** -3.88***
(-3.26) (-3.36) (-3.71) (-2.90) (-4.48) (-4.08)
Insider options trading 0.08 1.16 -17.97*** -18.39*** -13.84*** -13.63***
(0.02) (0.20) (-3.63) (-3.64) (-3.00) (-2.86)
Insider stock net sell -0.58** -0.80** -1.96 -1.80 -0.78 -0.82
(-2.17) (-2.65) (-1.18) (-1.10) (-1.54) (-1.54)
Pre-month return -0.15* -0.11 -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.16***
(-1.72) (-1.21) (-3.44) (-3.51) (-3.51) (-3.43)
Size 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.99) (1.07) (-0.56) (-0.54) (-0.22) (-0.22)
B/M 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
(0.58) (0.65) (0.33) (0.26) (0.70) (0.70)
Turnover 1.08 -0.39 0.16
(1.58) (-0.38) (0.27)
Intercept -0.32* -0.35** -0.08 -0.06 -0.15 -0.16
(-1.99) (-2.22) (-0.52) (-0.41) (-1.31) (-1.27)
N 52 52 79 79 110 110
R-Squared 0.2307 0.2641 0.2317 0.2331 0.2186 0.2190
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Figures
Figure 1: Average Daily Abnormal Return
These gures show the equal-weighted average daily abnormal return from day t   30 to
day t + 1, where day t is the ling date, across our sample rms with options trading data
(Figure 1(a)) and all bankruptcy rms (Figure 1(b)). CRSP value-weighted market return
is used as benchmark in calculating abnormal returns.
(a) Daily Abnormal Return for Sample Firms
-
30
-
20
-
10
0
Ab
no
rm
al
 re
tu
rn
-30 -20 -10 0
Days from filing
(b) Daily Abnormal Return for All Bankruptcy Firms
-
15
-
10
-
5
0
Ab
no
rm
al
 re
tu
rn
-30 -20 -10 0
Days from filing
43
Figure 2: Average Buy-and-hold Abnormal Return
This gure shows the equal-weighted average buy-and-hold abnormal return from day t  30
to day t + 1, where day t is the ling date, across our sample rms with options trading
data (solid line) and all bankruptcy rms (dashed line). On each trading day, we calculate
compounded return from day t   30 to that day as the buy-and-hold return. CRSP value-
weighted market return is used as benchmark in calculating abnormal returns.
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Firms with Options Data All Bankruptcy Firms
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Table A.1: A List of Bankruptcy Sample Firms
This table lists all bankruptcy rms in our nal sample. Bankruptcy data is obtained from
UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database. The sample period is from January 1996 to
December 2012. We rst require the rm to have CRSP return data on day t   1 and day t, and
accounting information from Compustat. We further require the rm to have options trading
data from OptionMetrics before it les for bankruptcy. We show the ling date, rm name, and
primary SIC code for the 58 rms in our nal sample.
Filing Date Firm Name Primary SIC
6/25/1996 Morrison Knudsen Corp. 1540
12/27/1996 Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. 2721
1/16/1998 Pegasus Gold, Inc. 1040
7/19/1998 FPA Medical Management, Inc. 8093
10/1/1998 Southern Pacic Funding Corporation 6159
10/5/1998 Boston Chicken, Inc. 5812
12/29/1999 Fruit of the Loom, Inc. 2250
1/7/2000 Applied Magnetics Corporation 3679
6/9/2000 Safety Kleen Corp. 4955
6/15/2000 Flooring America, Inc. 5700
12/6/2000 Armstrong World Industries, Inc. 3089
12/29/2000 Pacic Gateway Exchange, Inc. 4813
3/7/2001 Finova Group, Inc. 6153
4/2/2001 W.R. Grace & Company 2800
4/6/2001 Pacic Gas & Electric Co. 4931
4/18/2001 Winstar Communications, Inc. 4813
5/2/2001 Viatel Inc. 4813
6/25/2001 USG Corp. (2001) 3270
9/26/2001 Exodus Communications, Inc. 7389
9/28/2001 At Home Corp 7370
12/2/2001 Enron Corp. 6211
12/21/2001 ACT Manufacturing, Inc. 3672
4/1/2002 Covanta Energy Corp. 4991
9/12/2004 US Airways Group, Inc. (2004) 4512
9/22/2004 Interstate Bakeries Corporation 2050
1/11/2005 Ultimate Electronics, Inc. 5731
2/2/2005 Tower Automotive, Inc. 3460
8/6/2007 American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. 6798
11/8/2007 InPhonic, Inc. 4899
12/17/2007 Delta Financial Corporation 6163
4/10/2008 Frontier Airlines Holdings, Inc. (2008) 4512
8/4/2008 WCI Communities, Inc. 1531
9/15/2008 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 6211
9/26/2008 Washington Mutual, Inc. 6035
10/17/2008 WorldSpace, Inc. 4832
11/10/2008 Circuit City Stores, Inc. 5731
11/26/2008 LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. 6361
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1/14/2009 Nortel Networks Corp. (Nortel Networks, Inc.) 3661
5/17/2009 TXCO Resources Inc. 1311
10/1/2009 Edge Petroleum Corporation 1311
11/8/2009 Advanta Corp. 6141
11/15/2009 Champion Enterprises, Inc. 2451
8/25/2010 Trico Marine Services, Inc. (2010) 4400
11/8/2010 Ambac Financial Group, Inc. 6351
12/12/2010 Great Atlantic & Pacic Tea Company, Inc. 5411
2/16/2011 Borders Group, Inc. 5940
10/31/2011 MF Global Holdings Ltd. 6200
11/29/2011 AMR Corporation 4512
12/12/2011 Lee Enterprises, Incorporated 2711
1/4/2012 Trident Microsystems, Inc. 3674
1/19/2012 Eastman Kodak Company 3861
2/14/2012 Energy Conversion Devices, Inc. 3674
4/1/2012 Pinnacle Airlines Corp. 4512
7/9/2012 Patriot Coal Corporation 1220
8/17/2012 ATP Oil & Gas Corporation 1311
10/16/2012 A123 Systems, Inc. 3690
11/14/2012 Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. 4412
12/19/2012 THQ Inc. 7372
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